2026 International Conference on Networks Computers and Communications (ICNCCom 2026)

Malaysia’s government and government-linked company (GLC) networks face increasing long-term cybersecurity risks arising from the advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computing. Conventional public-key cryptography, widely deployed in inter-agency backbones, cloud platforms, and critical digital services, is vulnerable to future quantum attacks, necessitating proactive and technically grounded mitigation strategies. This paper proposes a hybrid Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)–Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) architecture tailored to Malaysia’s public-sector and GLC environments. The architecture combines standardized PQC algorithms for scalable, internet-facing and cloud-based services with QKD-derived symmetric keys for high-assurance optical corridors linking sensitive sites such as government data centres, financial hubs, and national critical information infrastructure. The proposed framework aligns with international standards from NIST, ETSI, and ITU-T, while addressing Malaysia-specific operational, governance, and regulatory considerations. Through a structured deployment methodology and performance evaluation model, the study demonstrates how hybrid QKD–PQC systems can enhance long-term confidentiality, crypto-agility, and national digital resilience without disrupting existing network operations.

Quantum Key Distribution;network operations;artificial intelligence;process innovation